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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAYWHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF PROCESS ON DESIGNATED STATUTORY AGENT
CONFERS JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT WHERE REGISTERED
LETTER TO SUCH DEFENDANT CONTAINING NOTICE OF SUIT REMAINS UNDELIVERF-In Powell v. Knight,' a case growing out of an automobile
accident between a resident plaintiff and a non-resident defendant, the
174 F. Supp. 191 (1947).
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plaintiff served process in the fashion directed by the local statute2 by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the designated
statutory official who thereafter forwarded the same by registered mail to
the last-known place of address of the defendant with a return receipt
attached. The return receipt for the registered article was signed by
defendant's mother-in-law, residing at the place of address, but the letter
never reached the defendant because she had, in the meantime, moved to
parts unknown and apparently never learned of the existence of the
action against her. Despite this, an attorney appeared for the defendant,
most likely acting to protect an insurance company who had issued a policy
on the car, and he moved to abate the action for lack of service of process,
basing such motion on the ground of failure to comply with the provision
in question. That motion, at plaintiff's request, was overruled by the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on the ground
that plaintiff's efforts to procure service were sufficient, under the statute,
to establish jurisdiction.
It is undoubtedly true that a court does not obtain in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless there be service of
process on him,3 or on his agent, while within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. If that agent is one who has been personally appointed by
the defendant, it can be presumed that knowledge of the pendency of the
suit has been conveyed to the principal. 4 If, however, the agent is one
not personally but only impliedly appointed by statute, some provision
must be made in the statute for the giving of notice to the non-resident
principal to meet the requirements of due process, 5 otherwise the attempted
service will prove ineffective to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 6

It is

not necessary that actual notice, in fact, be given to the non-resident
principal to sustain a service made upon his implied agent but, to meet
constitutional requirements, the provision for notice must be such as to
insure that he will, under ordinary circumstances, receive actual notice.
In the light of these requirements and in view of the prevalence of
statutes designating some local official as agent for service for all non2

Va. Code 1942, Tit. 18. Ch. 90B, § 2154(70) (i), directs: "... provided that notice

of such service and a copy of the process or notice are forthwith sent by registered
mail, with registered delivery receipt requested, by the director to the defendant ...
and an affidavit of compliance herewith ..
be filed with the declaration or notice of
motion."
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
4 The general presumption that knowledge on the part of the agent is to be deemed
knowledge on the part of the principal should suffice for this purpose as well as for
other purposes: Curtis C. & H. Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 216, 43 S. Ct. 570,
67 L. Ed. 954 (1923).
5 Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
6 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230
(1928).
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resident drivers who use the highways of other states, at least as to causes
of action growing out of such use of those highways, there is occasion to
review the several provisions currently in force. One group of statutes,
found in twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia, 7 may be
exemplified by the language found in the New York act which directs
that "notice of such service and a copy of the summons and complaint
are to be forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant's return receipt, the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance
and a copy of the summons and complaint shall be filed with the clerk
of the court in which the action is pending."" By requiring the filing of
record of a return receipt signed by the defendant, these jurisdictions
have gone to the extreme to insure notice short of requiring proof that
the non-resident defendant has opened the registered article and examined
the contents. Nothing less will suffice, for those courts which have had
occasion to pass upon the meaning of such a provision have interpreted
it to require that the defendant actually receive the notice of the pendency
of the suit.9
A second group of statutes, effective in thirteen states, 10 may be
typified by the Illinois provision which directs that "notice of such service
7 D. of C. Code 1940, Tit. 40, Ch. 4, § 40-403; Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 199; Ariz.
Code Ann. 1939, Ch. 66, § 227; Cal. Deering Vehicle Code Ann. 1944, Ch. 1, § 404;
Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 16, § 48 (1) ; Del. Laws, Vol. 35, Ch. 225, § 2; Fla.
Stats. 1941, Tit. 6, Ch. 47, §§ 47.29-47.30; Ga. Laws 1937, Part 1, Tit. 6, No. 444, at
p. 732; Ida. Code Ann. 1932 (1940 Supp.), Tit. 48, Ch. 5a. § 32; Burns' Ind. Stats.
Ann. 1933, Vol. 8, Ch. 10, § 47-1043; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 1, Ch. 321, § 321.501; La.
Dart Civ. Code 1939, Vol. 4, Ch. 4, § 5297; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Vol. 1, Ch. 19, § 59;
Flack Ann. Md. Code 1939, Vol. 2, Art. 56, § 167; Mass. Laws 1933, Vol. 3, Ch. 90,
§ 3c; Mich. Stats. Ann. 1937, Vol. 8, Tit. 9, Ch. 74, § 9.1701; Miss. Laws 1938, Ch.
148, § 11; Mont. Rev. Code 1935, Vol. 1, Ch. 152, § 1760.14; Nev. Comp. Laws (193141 Supp.), Vol. 1, §4441.01; N. J. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, Ch. 32, § 2:32-34.2; Cahill Cons.
Laws N. Y., 1937 Supp., Ch. 64-a, § 52; N. Car. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 1,
§ 1-105; Okla. Stats. Ann. (Perm. Ed.), Tit. 47, Ch. 1, § 7; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
1940, Vol. 8, Tit. 115, Art. 5, § 115-129; S.Car. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. 7, Ch. 16, § 437;
Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 6, Tit. 1, Ch. 5, Art. 4, §§ 8671, 8672 and 8673;
Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1937, Vol. 7a, Tit. 41, §6360-129; W. Va. Code
Ann. 1943, Ch. 56, § 5555 (1).
8Cahill Cons. Laws N. Y., 1937 Supp., Ch. 64-a, § 52. The statutes cited in note 7,
ante, are not identical in language but all possess similar purport to the New York
provision.
9 Smyrnios v. Weintraub, 3 F. Supp. 439 (1933) ; Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5
W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A. 327 (1932) ; Spearman v. Stover, 184 La. 620,
170 So. 259 (1936). In New York, the court has gone so far as to say that if the
defendant refuses to accept the registered letter, the plaintiff has not complied with
the statute: Dwyer v. Shalck, 232 App. Div. 780, 248 N. Y. S. 355 (1931). But see
contra: Creadick v. Keller, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 169. 160 A. 909 (1932) ; State
ex rel. Charette v. Dist. Ct. of Second Judicial District, 107 Mont. 489, 86 P. (2d)
750 (1939) ; and Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S.E. (2d) 595 (1942), where
it was held that, compliance with the statute having been rendered impossible by
the defendant's own wilful conduct, he was in no position to complain.
10 Ark. Pope Dig. 1937, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 1375: Conn. Gen. Stats. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch.
288, §5473; II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , §23; Minn. Stats. Ann. 1945, Vol. 12,
Ch. 170, § 170.55; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1939, Vol. 18. Ch. 45, Art. 1, § 8410.5; Neb.
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and a copy of the process are . . to be sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, at the last known address of the said defendant,
and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith is to be appended to the
summons."11 Since these provisions merely direct that the notice be sent
to the "last known address" of the defendant, there is indication of a
legislative intent that actual delivery to the non-resident shall not be
deemed a prerequisite to jurisdiction. 12 That result, at least, was achieved
in the Ohio case of Henderskot v. Ferkel'3 although the statute there also
provides that the return receipt of the defendant should be filed in the
record. But strict construction must be given to the words "last known
address" in order to comply with fundamental constitutional concepts of
due process' 4 as well as to prevent fraud in the obtaining of a judgment
by default. As the Connecticut court observed in the case of Hartley v.
Vitiello,15 unless the defendant has departed for parts unknown, that
phrase means his "actual address. If he has disappeared, it means his
last address so far as it is reasonably possible to ascertain it. This address
the plaintiff must learn at his own peril, and only if the copy is mailed
to it is there a compliance with the statute."16
Four other statutes, comprising the third group which includes the
one involved in the instant case,'1 7 are susceptible of two interpretations,
i.e. that actual delivery of notice is or is not required to effectuate process.
These statutes do not require that notice be sent to the "last known
address" of the defendant nor impose the requirement that the return
receipt be filed in the action. Those found in Kansas, Texas and Vermont
merely provide that the registered mail be sent "to the defendant,"
although the Virginia one adds the further proviso that a registered
delivery receipt be "requested."
It would be possible, by giving a literal
Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. 2. Ch. 25. Art. 5. § 25-530: N. Dak. Rev. Code 1943. Vol. 3, Ch.
28-06, § 28-0612; Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 4a, Ch. 21, § 6308-2; Purdon's Pa.
Stats. Ann.. Tit. 75. Ch. 4, . 1202: S. Dak. Code 1939, Vol. 2. Ch. 33.08, § 33.0809;
Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 3. Tit. 57. Ch. 13, § 12; Wis. Stats. 1945. Ch. 85, § 85.05(3)
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, Ch. 60, § 60-1101.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95y/_, § 23.
12 Hartley v. Vitiello. 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931) , Schilling v. Odlebak, 224
N. W. 694, 177 Minn. 90 (1929). approving .Tones v. Paxton, 27 F. (2d) 364 (1928);
Herzoff v. Homnell. 120 Neb. 475, 233 N. W. 458 (1930) : Ashbrook v. Otto, 2 Ohio
0. 534 (1935) : Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937) ; Sorrenson
v. Stowers. 251 Wis. 398, 29 N. W. (2d) 512 (1947) : State ex rel. Cronkhite v.
Beldon, 193 Wis. 145. 211 N. W. 916, 57 A. L. R. 1218 (1927).
i', 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N. E. (2d) 205 (1944).
14 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230
(1928).
15 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931).
16 113 Conn. 74 at 80, 154 A. 255 at 258.
17 Kan. Gen. Stats. 1935. Ch. 8. Art. 4. § 8-402: Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.. Vol.
5, Tit. 42, Art. 2039a; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933. Tit. 22, Ch. 208, § 5002; Va. Code, Tit. 18,
Ch. 901R. § 2154(70) (i).
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interpretation to the phrase "to the defendant," to reach the result that
actual delivery would be necessary, 8 but in view of the tenor of the language used by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wichter v.
Pizzutti'9 it would seem to be more in keeping with the policy underlying
these statutes not so much to require actual delivery of notice to the
non-resident as to expect that the plaintiff will make an honest effort to
20
effectuate that delivery.
If that is the policy, the burden should be placed upon the defendant
to apprize himself of the fact that a suit has been brought against him
rather than to deprive the plaintiff of his remedy because his honest
efforts have failed to accomplish the fact of notice. The court in the
instant case, at least, adopted this view and there is much to justify such
a holding.
J. A. SACCONE
0

CHARITIES-CONSTRUCTION,

ADMINISTRATION,

AND

ENFORCEMENT-

WHETHER OR NOT CHARITABLE CORPORATION WHICH HAS INSURED AGAINST
TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE MAY INvOKE DEFENSE OF IMMUNITY-The

Appellate Court for the First District recently considered and decided the
case of Wendt v. Servite Fathers,' an ordinary negligence action brought
in behalf of a minor plaintiff to recover damages for injuries sustained
by him when playing in a stadium owned by defendant. The defendant
pleaded that it was an eleemosynary institution by reason whereof
plaintiff was not entitled to any damages against it for his injuries. The
reply filed by plaintiff alleged that the defendant carried a liability
insurance policy by the terms of which the insurance carrier had agreed
to pay on behalf of the defendant all sums which the defendant should
become obligated to pay for damages because of injuries sustained by
any person while on defendant's premises. After separate hearings before
Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A. 327 (1932).
19 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230 (1928).
20 Four other statutes are not capable of classification. N. H. Rev. Laws 1942.
Vol. 1, Ch. 116, § 43, requires filing of the return receipt but, against the possibility
that the registered article cannot be delivered, permits the court to order such addi18

tional service "as justice may require."

Ky. Rev. Stat. 1946, Ch. 188, § 188.030,

likewise provides for filing of a return receipt but it was interpreted, in Morris v.
Argo-Collier Truck Lines. 39 F. Supp. 602 (1941), so as not to require delivery to
defendant. The New Mexico provision, N. M. Stats. Ann. 1941, Vol. 5, Ch. 68. Art. 10,
§ 68-1004, does not authorize service by registered mail at all but calls for delivery
"to the defendant personally without the state." together with proof of such service
by affidavit, in much the same fashion as is permitted in Illinois in order. to confer
in rem but not in personam jurisdiction: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 140. The
Rhode Island provision R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 103, § 1. requires the filing of the
"sender's postoffice receipt of sending" in the action, but says nothing about request-

ing a return receipt or the filing thereof.
' 332 Ill. App. 618. 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

two judges in the trial court, the case terminated in a judgment dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.2 On plaintiff's appeal, the judgment dismissing
the complaint was reversed and the cause was remanded on the ground
that "where insurance exists and provides a fund from which tort liability
may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund, the defense of immunity is not available. "3
The law in the United States on the subject of the tort liability of
charitable corporations is lacking in uniformity, both as to reasons and
4
results. Immunity was originally granted an eleemosynary corporation
5
in the first case in this country, which arose in Massachusetts, on the
basis of an English precedent which had been overruled 7 before that
decision was achieved. The Massachusetts case was, nevertheless, followed
in the early cases, except in Rhode Island.8 After the adoption of this
non-liability rule, whether on the "trust fund," "waiver," or public policy
theories, the courts of this country attempted to skirt its effect, some by
rejecting the rule outright, 9 while others laboriously achieved liability
despite the rule.' 0 As a result, numerous exceptions were developed.",
It was with the suspected intention of directing attention to and, perhaps,
unifying this chaotic field of law that so meritorious an effort was made,
12
in the case of President and Directorsof Georgetown College v. Hughes,
to reconsider the arguments theretofore used in support of immunity
granted to charitable institutions.
2 The case was heard first by Fisher, J., who, by his ruling striking out the defense
that defendant was an eleemosynary institution and allowing plaintiff's allegations
as to insurance to stand, plainly held that the defendant could be liable in damages.
At the trial, Anderson, J., refused to accept any evidence offered by plaintiff and,
with the record showing the prior ruling, entered an order dismissing the suit.
3 332 Ill. App. 618 at 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 at 349.
4 Immunity from tort liability has never been granted to individual volunteers:
Cavey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N. W. &S9, 12 A. L. R. 904 (1921), Depue v.
Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485 (1907).
5 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital. 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529
(1876).
6Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192 (1861).
7 Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
8 Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879). The
court, in passing, said that as the legislature created the corporation it ought to
grant the immunity too. It is understood that, following the suggestion thus made,
the Rhode Island legislature subsequently enacted a statute making charitable corporations free from tort liability.
9 Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699
(1920) ; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 A. 190, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 496 (1906).
10 See, for example, Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163,
7 N. E. (2d) 28, 109 A. L. R. 1197 (1937). See also McCaskill, "Respondeat Superior
as Applied in New York to Quasi-Public and Eleemosynary Corporations." 5 Corn.
L. Q. 409. 6 Corn. L. Q. 56 (1920).
11 A breakdown of the cases and their varied holdings appears in the case of
President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes. 130 F. (2d) S10 at 81S-22
(1942).
12 130 F. (2d) 810 (1942).
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Illinois courts were first called upon to determine the liability of
charitable corporations in 1905, at which time it was decided that the
funds and property of such organizations were held in trust and could
not be diverted for the purpose of paying damages in satisfaction of
injuries caused by the negligent acts of their employees to persons who
were enjoying the benefits of the charity.'3 It was not until 1942, in the
case of Myers v. Young Men's Christian Association of Quincy,14 that
the problem of the effect of insurance upon the immunity of an
eleemosynary institution came before an Illinois reviewing court. There
the count alleging coverage by an insurance company was stricken for
the reason that it would call to the attention of the jury the fact that the
defendant was protected by insurance, a point not permitted even in the
case of non-charitable defendants. 15 The course of the pleadings in the
instant case, however, avoided that possibility for no mention was made
of insurance until it became necessary for the plaintiff to file a reply
and, even then, no debatable issue arose for the defendant did not deny
the existence of insurance. Furthermore, the plaintiff skillfully avoided
any imputation that trust funds might be jeopardized by voluntarily
waiving any right to levy upon the property of the corporate defendant
and by keeping the demand for judgment within the policy limits.
Only one other Illinois case has involved the same problem, that of
Piper v. Epstein,16 but the court in the instant case felt that it was not
17
bound, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow the holding therein.

The court there did not decide the issue of liability as it might be affected
by insurance but rather interpreted the holding in Parks v. Northwestern
University' as establishing a rule of absolute immunity which, the court
said, "has been followed in an unbroken line of decisions."' 19 In the
forty-odd years between the determination in the Parks case and that in
the Piper case, there were fourteen citations of the initial decision in this
state, six in the Supreme Court and eight in the various Appellate Courts.
20
One has no bearing at all on the present question for it was a tax case.
1 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556,4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
14316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KEN'T LAW
RL-vEw 256, 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 211.
15 A related problem, that of disclosing the fact of insurance in the course of
interrogating prospective jurors, is discussed in Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74
N. E. (2d) 601 (1947). See also Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d)
499 (1938).
16326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945). See criticism thereof in 24 CHI1CAGOKENT LAW REvIEW 266.
17 A solitary decision of recent date never is held to irrevocably state the law:
Hopkins v. McCann, 19 Ill. 112 (1857), Frink v. Darst, 14 Ill. 304 (1853).
18218 Il1. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
19 Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400 at 406, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 at 143.
20 People v. Ravenswood Hospital, 238 Ill. 137, 87 N. E. 305 (1909).
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Three consider whether or not the receiving of paying strangers rather
than true recipients of charity operates to change the character of the
charitable corporation, 21 while a fourth flatly holds that the stranger who
has paid for the services cannot recover.2 2 The sixth case permitted
recovery when the suit was based on breach of contract,2 3 but the seventh
repudiated that holding, saying that the nature of the action should have
no bearing on the question of tort liability.2 4 Three more cases restate
the trust fund doctrine as originally set forth 25 and, of the remainder,
four state the general proposition that charitable corporations are not
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior without mentioning the
theoretical basis, being content merely to cite the Parks case.2 6 Only in
Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 27 which did not cite the

Parks decision, was it held that a benevolent organization which maintained
a licensed bar and put the profits therefrom into the treasury could be
28
subjected to liability under the Dram Shop Act.
From these cases it would appear that while the Illinois courts have
held that the doctrine of respondeat superior should not extend to
charitable institutions because the trust funds thereof might be destroyed
or diverted, yet in no case, except that of Piper v. Epstein,29 has it been
held that the exemption from liability is absolute. It would rather seem
that non-liability is to be the rule only when a contrary decision would
serve to deplete the trust fund. If that is so, it would follow that the
rule of non-liability should be cast aside when the charitable organization
does carry insurance, whether that insurance be indemnity or liability
protection. Other jurisdictions may have refused recovery when the
insurance was of the indemnity type,30 but there is no distinction made
21 Morgan v. National Trust Bank, 331 Ill. 182. 162 N. E. 888 (1928) ; Summers v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill. 564, 167 N. E. 777 (1929) ; Tollefson v. City of
Ottawa, 129 Ill. App. 139 (1906).
22 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 247 Ill. App. 331 (1928). That case might
involve a misinterpretation of the decision in the Parks case, for it was there said
that trust funds should not be diverted to pay damages for injuries due to the
negligent or wrongful acts of servants to "persons who are enjoying the benefit of
the charity."
23 Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
24 Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. (2d) 314
(1942).
25 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 355 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929) ; Marabia
v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 224 Ill. App. 367 (1922) ; Alton Mfg. Co. v. Garrett
Biblical Inst., 148 Ill. App. 23 (1909).
26 Hendricks v. Urbana Park Dist., 265 Ill. App. 102 (1932) ; Curtis v. City of
Paris, 234 II. App. 157 (1924) ; Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 101 N. E.
960 (1913) ; Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134. 81 N. E. 823 (1907).
27 309 I1. App. 145, 33 N. E. (2d) .161 (1941).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 135.
29 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945).
30 Williams v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753, 62 A. L. R. 721
(1928) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R.
110(; (1930).
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in Illinois31 and none should be for in either event the charitable corporation is needlessly paying out trust funds to purchase insurance to protect
it from a liability which does not exist if the courts fail to recognize
liability where there is insurance. The whole trust fund argument itself
is based on the concept that the donor would not give if he thought his
32
funds would be diverted to the purpose of satisfying judgments.

Is it

reasonable to suppose that he would donate if he thought the income from
such funds would be used to pay premiums to an insurance company
organized for profit to protect his favorite charity from a non-existent
liability? Other jurisdictions have felt that the presence of insurance is
enough to protect the trust funds so donated and they have, accordingly,
denied immunity. 33 There is no legal objection to a similar holding here.
One other point deserves notice. The insurance policy in the instant
case contained a rider providing that the carrier would not use the immunity of the insured in the defense of its suits unless requested so to
do by the insured.3 4 There is occasion to believe that this provision
constitutes a highly unconscionable agreement between insured and
insurer, for the existence of public liability insurance has come to mean
a matter of benefit to the public as well as to the insured. 5 Once an
accident has occurred in the ordinary case, the liability of the insurance
company is fixed. No act or agreement on the part of the insured will
allow the insurance company to escape the liability assumed by it under
the insurance policy, for it has been said that the "rights of the injured
party arise immediately upon the happening of the accident. This right,
arising from contract, cannot be destroyed by an attempted subsequent
cancellation, release, or compromise by the insured and the insurer. '" '3
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 1000, now gives the injured person a right to
maintain an action against the insurance company. The problem of insurance, and
of indemnity In particular, was treated in an unpublished opinion in the case of
Shaleem v. The Newberry Library, 39-S-11479, Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois. Fankhauser, J., there noted that "If you eliminate from this opinion the
court's concern [i.e. the concern expressed in Parks v. Northwestern University] for
the protection of the fund, what would be left upon which to base the opinion? ...
When the fund is not jeopardized and cannot be reached to satisfy a judgment
against the institute, the question of non-liability manifestly disappears." See also
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938),
where the judgment was expressly made payable out of the proceeds of the liability
insurance.
32 See the discussion of this point in Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill.
381 at 385, 75 N. E. 991 at 993 (1905).
•3 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n. 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) &35.
133 A. L. R. 819 (1939) ; Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767.
167 S. W. (2d) 700 (1943) ; Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135.
127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
34 332 Ill.
App. 618 at 620, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 at 343.
35 1l1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95/_, § 58b, is indicative of a legislative trend to insist
upon insurance for the benefit of third persons.
.36
Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas. 82 F. (2d) 593 at 599
(1936). quoted with approval in Scott v. Freeport Casualty Co.. 392 Ill.
332, 64 N. F
(2d) 542 (1946).
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Clearly, if this were not the rule, the insured could grant or withhold
assured compensation for its negligent acts as it pleased. If the insured
may not do so after injury, there is reason to believe it should not be
allowed to do so beforehand. No individual or corporate body should
be allowed such discriminatory power, much less so if it enjoys the
privileges accorded to charitable corporations. To the extent that they
see fit to carry insurance, they should provide protection without stint.
The holding in the instant case recognizes a modern trend which has
been argued for by legal scholars and jurists alike. But it presents only
the first step forward. The general immunity granted to charitable
corporations by the courts should be withdrawn. The legislature has not
seen 'fit to act and it is not necessary that it should for it was not the
legislature that granted this immunity, even though it has seen fit to grant
other privileges. The change can, and should, be brought about by the
courts.
Miss C. L.

SAMUELSON
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STATUTE FROM OPERATING TO BAR SUIT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-The
recent Ohio case of Sabol v. Pekoc' required that interpretation be placed
upon a time provision contained in a statute creating a cause of action
for wrongful death. 2 In that case, the facts disclosed that plaintiff's
intestate had been employed as a janitress by the defendant in the latter's
building. In the course of that employment, the decedent met her death
through the negligence of the defendant. Upon hearing of this misfortune, the defendant informed the plaintiff that his, the defendant's,
mother was the owner of the building and he recommended that suit be
brought against her as she was adequately insured. A suit was, accordingly, promptly brought against the mother. The plaintiff subsequently
discovered that the present defendant, the son, was the actual owner of
the building and responsible for the death so another action was instituted
against him. To that action the defendant filed a demurrer, relying on
the ground that the action was not brought within the time fixed by the
Ohio statute,3 hence the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
trial court sustained the demurrer but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
of Ohio reversed, holding that the active fraud practiced by the defendant

148 Ohio St. 545, 76 N. E. (2d) 84 (1947).
Ohio Gen. Code 1947, §§ 10509-166 to 10509-169.
;;Ibid., § 10509-167, provides: ". . . every such action must be commenced within
two years after such death of such deceased person ... "
2
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was the cause of the failure to sue more promptly. 4 It concluded that
the time for bringing the action did not begin to run until the fraud was
discovered and that the defendant was, by his own conduct, estopped
from asserting such a defense.5 On further appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that general principles of law which might
serve to toll the time for bringing an ordinary action were not applicable
to actions such as the one in question and, in the absence of a special
saving clause, the suit was barred.
The wrongful death of a human being, at common law, did not give
rise to any civil cause of action whatever 6 but, to ameliorate the harshness
of such a rule, the English Parliament, in. 1846, passed the celebrated
Lord Campbell's Act 7 which has served as the model for similar acts in
this country. All such statutes contain within themselves a time provision
dealing with the period within which the action must be brought,8 and
such time stipulations have been the cause of much litigation and comment.
The problem created thereby resolves itself into one as to whether such
time period should be treated pre-emptively, i.e. as affecting the right, or
whether it should be treated prescriptively, thereby affecting the remedy
only. If the former, common law or other statutory reasons for tolling
the period would not apply; if the latter, they would.
The Ohio court in the instant case reasoned that, since the statute
providing for an action for death was in derogation of the common law,
a petition to recover thereon must be filed strictly according to the statute's
essential terms, for such was the sole source of the right upon which the
petition was based.9 If, therefore, such a statute requires that the action
should be commenced within a specified time after the death, the provision
is to be treated as a condition qualifying the right of action, and not a
mere limitation on the remedy. In other words, the time limitation is not
properly a period of limitation, as that term is generally understood, but
serves rather as a qualification and condition restricting the right granted.
4-

Ohio App..-, 72 N. E. (2d) 270 (1947).

5 The court apparently relied on the general rule that one may not take advantage
of his own wrongdoing and seek refuge under the statute of limitations when he
has, by fraudulent conduct or representations, successfully concealed his liability
beyond the period fixed by law: Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 30 Cal. (2d) 165,
180 P. (2d) 900 (1947) ; Fortune v. English, 226 Ill. 262, 80 N. E. 781 (1907). See
also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 23.
6 Baker v. Bolten, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See also 25 C. J. S.,
Death, § 13, p. 1072.
79 and 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
8 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
9 Under a comparable provision in the Federal Employers Liability Act, the court
in American Ry. Co. of Puerto Rico v. Coranas, 230 F. 545 at 546 (1916), pointed
out that the bringing of the action within the specified time is a "condition to the
exercise of the right, and if the condition is not complied with, the parties stand with
respect to the wrongful act as though the statute had not been enacted."
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Not being a true statute of limitation, common law or other statutory rules
which would permit avoidance of a defense of the statute of limitations
would be inapplicable to a plea that the wrongful death action was not
commenced within the time prescribed.
Such has likewise been the
holding of all the courts which have had occasion to decide the issue with
but a single exception.' 0 That holding has been achieved not only where
the facts on the face of the complaint provide clear evidence that the
action was brought too late"' but also where other grounds for tolling an
12
ordinary statute of limitations such as concealment of a cause of action,
absence from the jurisdiction,"3 legal disability, 14 and inadvertent failure
of the prior action, 15 have been made to appear.
Although the courts of Illinois have never decided this exact issue,
the path pursued on a similar question has been a curious one. In Lake
Shore & Michigaln Southern Railway Company v. Dylanski, 6 the problem
was whether or not one aspect of the saving clauses in the Limitation Act 7
could operate in a case arising under the Injuries Act,' 8 and particularly
whether or not an involuntary nonsuit of an action promptly brought
thereunder could serve to save another wrongful death action begun after
the prescribed period but well within the time fixed by the saving statute
mentioned. The Illinois Appellate Court refused to extend the time period
fixed by the Injuries Act, despite the nonsuit of the original action, hence
held the second action was barred. That view was again reiterated in
Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company,19 where the court stated
that the bringing of an action for wrongful death within the time fixed
by the Injuries Act was a condition precedent to recovery, consequently
a declaration which did not, on its face, show that the action was brought
within such period was subject to demurrer. On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, however, that decision was reversed and it was indicated
that the time period might or might not be a condition precedent to
lo See cases cited in annotations in 67 A. L. R. 1059 and 132 A. L. R. 322. But
see Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 P. 571 (1930). The defendants there
concealed that they were responsible for the bombing that caused the death of the
plaintiff's intestate. The upper court, reversing an order which had sustained a
demurrer to the complaint, stated that the time provision in the Oklahoma statute
was merely a statute of limitation because the section giving the right to sue was
in the same chapter of the code as the one dealing with limitations in general,
hence bore evidence of a legislative intent that the time limit should be treated as
-in ordinary statute of limitation.
11 The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199. 7 8. Ct. 140. 30 L. Ed. 358 (1886).
12 Bell v. Wabash By. Co., 58 F. (2d) 569 (1932).
13 Tylor v. Southern fy. Co., 6 F. Supp. 259 (1934).
14 Westcott v. Young. 275 Mass. 82. 175 N. E. 153 (1931).
-, Partee v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 204 F. 970 (1913).
16 67 111. App. 114 (1890).

17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 23.
18 Ibid., Ch. 70, § 2.

19 101 Ill. App. 431 (1902).
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plaintiff's right to recover for each case had to depend on its own
particular facts, so the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to set up
20
any facts which might form an exception to the statute of limitations.
21
That line of reasoning was followed in two subsequent cases.
Within five years thereafter the Illinois Appellate Court, in Rabig v.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company,22 went
back to and reaffirmed the views expressed in the Dylanski case and refused
to permit application of the saving clause concerning new actions begun
after nonsuit to suits based on the Injuries Act. Since that time, the
decisions in this state have been uniform on the point that the time
provision in the Injuries Act serves as a condition precedent to the right
23
of action.
By so returning to the view followed by an almost unanimous majority
of courts elsewhere, the Illinois courts again gave logical application to
the fundamental premise that time limits in statutory actions such as the
one for wrongful death are to be treated pre-emptively. Reason demands
the conclusion attained under the majority rule for statutes of that
character are creative in nature and fix the necessary elements which
the plaintiff must allege and prove in order to qualify for the right
there provided. As prompt action is one of these elements, the plaintiff
should necessarily allege and prove compliance as a condition to the
enjoyment of the right rather than to expect the defendant to counter
with a claim that long delay should serve as a limitation on the remedy.
Yet it seems difficult to reconcile such logical reasoning with the fact
that the very purpose of wrongful death statutes was to relieve against
harsh results produced by the common law. No one could deny that the
result reached in the instant case, although logically correct, is gravely
unjust and apt to encourage fraud as a means to avoid liability. That sort
of injustice and deception has been prevented, as to ordinary suits, by
the adoption of general savings provisions. If they are not available
for use in wrongful death or similar statutory actions, it would seem high
time that they were made applicable through suitable statutory modification
in, or addition to, the statute which serves to create the right.
S. A. MALATO
20200 ni1. 66, 65 N. E. 632 (1902). Subsequent thereto, the case had a long and
eventful history culminating in dismissal of a writ of error in 256 U. S. 125, 41 S. Ct.

402, 65 L. Ed. 856 (1921).

21Heimberger v. The Elliott Frog & Switch Co., 245 Ill. 448, 92 N. E. 297 (1910);
Stephan v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 106 Ill. App. 13 (1903).
22 204 Ill. App. 493 (1917).
23 In Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939), and Friend v.
Alton Ry. Co., 283 Ill. App. 366 (1936), for example, the filing of an amended complaint more than one year after the cause of action arose has been held insufficient
to sustain a wrongful death case begun in apt time, the amendment having been
denied retroactive operation. See also Bishop v. Chicago Ry. Co., 303 Ill. 273, 135
N. E. 499 (1922). and Corlin v. Peerless Gas Co.. 283 Il. 142, 119 N. E. 66 (1918).
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ING THAT RENT FOR EXTENDED TERM SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES WILL SUPPORT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AT A REASONABLE RENTAL-

The question of whether a court of equity should grant specific performance at the request of a tenant, of an option to renew and extend a
lease was the issue in the recent Ohio case of Moss v. Olson.' The option
there involved fixed a definite term for the renewal period but left the
rental to be paid "to be subject to agreement between the parties" at
the time of renewal. The complaint alleged due notice of an intention
to exercise the option and also a request made on the defendant to enter
into negotiations for the purpose of agreeing upon the rental. It charged
that defendant refused so to negotiate but instead served the lessees with
a notice of termination of tenancy. Plaintiffs also alleged that they had
spent large sums in preparing the demised premises for use by them as

a food market; that such sums for improvements would not have been
expended if the lessor had not granted the option contained in the lease;
that plaintiffs were without adequate remedy at law, hence prayed the
court to fix a reasonable rent and to specifically enforce the option.

Defendant's general demurrer was sustained by the lower court on the
ground that the option was void for uncertainty and indefiniteness and
the suit was dismissed. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed that holding,
but, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the latter reversed and ordered
specific performance, directing the trial court to fix a reasonable rental
for the renewal period.
As in the case of contracts generally, an option or covenant for
renewal must be founded on a consideration, 2 but there is general agreement on the point that an option or covenant to renew a lease, when
contained in the lease itself, is based on a sufficient consideration, even
if unilateral in the sense that the lessee is under no obligation to renew,3
because such a covenant may well be considered as a material inducement
to the execution of the lease. Like any other mutual contract, however,
the option must be definite and certain in its terms in order to be enforcible ;4 certain and definite both as to the duration of the renewal period
and the rent to be paid. 5
Ohio St. -, 76 N. E. (2d) 875 (1947). Weygandt, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2 Fienberg v. Adelman, 260 Mass. 143, 156 N. E. 896 (1927).
3 Fuchs v. Peterson, 315 Ill. 370, 146 N. E. 556 (1925).
4 Giglio v. Saia, 140 Miss. 769. 106 So. 513 (1926) ; Swedish-American Nat'l Bank
v. Merz, 179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919) ; Moran v. Wellington, 101 Misc. 594, 167 N. Y. S.
465 (1917). The same rule is applied to an option to purchase the demised premises:
Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Il. 403, 37 N. E. 73 (1894).
Levin v. Munk, 97 Ind. App. 118, 169 N. E. 82 (1929) ; Baurman v. Binzen, 16
N. Y. S. 342 (1891). But see Metcalf Auto Co. v. Norton, 119 Me. 103, 109 A. 384
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A renewal covenant in a lease which leaves the amount of rental to
be determined under some future agreement between the parties would
generally be regarded as unenforcible and void for uncertainty and
indefiniteness6 by any court arbitrarily applying a strict view to the
subject. But the cases in point can be classified into two categories:
first, those in which the renewal provision makes no reference to the term
and rental yet the court might find an inference, from such omission,
that the rental and term were to be the same as that fixed in the original
lease;7 and second, those where the rental for the renewal period is
obviously not to be the same as controlled the original lease but is to be
made the basis of future ascertainment. The validity and enforcibility
of the latter will depend upon whether or not sufficiently definite standards
are set up by which to determine the new rental."
The option in the instant case clearly fell outside the first class for
there was evidence from its terms that a straight renewal was not within
the contemplation of the parties. Tested by the second category, it lacked
both standards and machinery by which the new rental could be determined
unless it was possible to find a tacit understanding that the future rental
was to be a reasonable one if the parties themselves could arrive at no
agreement as to the amount. In the absence of such an understanding,
the court would clearly be guilty of rewriting a contract for the parties
and then specifically enforcing it as so rewritten.9
As support for its decision that the option contemplated a reasonable
renewal rental, the court cited decisions from other jurisdictions but an
examination thereof reveals that most of them are not in point and are
easily distinguishable from the issue presented by the instant case. They
(1920), where the lease provided "with privilege on part of lessee to release at end
of term for a term of years to be agreed upon at same rental." The lessee elected to
renew for two years and the court sustained that action on the ground that "a term
of years" meant not less than two years.
6Vartabedian v. Peerless Wrench Co., 46 R. I. 472, 129 A. 239 (1925).
7A simple covenant to renew which makes no provision as to the terms and conditions of the renewal implies a renewal for the same rental, terms and conditions as
provided in the original lease, hence is sufficiently definite, according to Kean v.
Story & Clark Piano Co., 121 Minn. 198, 140 N. W. 1031 (1913) ; 58-59 Realty Corp.
v. Park Central Valet, 252 App. Div. 72, 297 N. Y. S. 40 (1937) ; Tracy v. Albany
Exch. Co., 7 N. Y. 472, 57 Am. Dec. 538 (1852).
s For example, in Duifield v. Whitlock, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 55 (1841), the lease
contained a covenant that at expiration the "lessor should grant a new lease for
twenty years upon such terms as he might think proper and as might be approved
by lessee." Specific performance was denied on the ground that the covenant was
too vague.
9 A comparable problem concerning specific enforcement of an option to purchase
the demised premises, where no price was fixed, was considered in Shayeb v. Holland,
- Mass. -, 73 N. E. (2d) 731 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 188.
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involved options under which the rent was to be fixed by arbitrators ;1o
or specifically provided that the rent was to be a reasonable sum ;11 was
to be ascertained by what responsible parties would agree to give for the
13
use of the premises ;12 or at what the rent would be worth at that time ;
or provided that the parties should agree on a rental if possible but if not
then that appraisers were to be appointed.' 4 Clauses of this character
sufficiently set up some method by which to determine the renewal rental
or else clearly support the inference that a reasonable rent was intended.
In the instant case, however, the parties expressly provided that the rent
was to be "subject to agreement" between the parties; an expression
capable of only one construction, i.e. the parties were to agree upon the
rental, an expression of intention so unequivocal as to leave no room for
any inference.
Only three cases cited would appear to substantiate the view taken by
the Ohio court. In the first, that of Rainwater v. Hobeika,'" the original
lease provided for a five-year term but after the execution thereof the
tenant procured an option for an additional five years "at a price to be
agreed upon at that time." The option was sought because the tenant
planned considerable remodelling at a cost twice the amount originally
contemplated as well as the installation of expensive custom-made equipment and fixtures which would be practically worthless if removed. The
lessor, about three months before the original lease expired, gave notice
to vacate on the ground that the lessee had not communicated his intention
to renew and the lessor had, therefore, leased the premises to another
party. The court held that the fact of notice strongly indicated an
intention on the part of the lessor not to bargain in good faith and, as
the tenant had performed as planned, he would suffer serious financial
loss unless the court enforced the option. In direct contrast, there was
no charge of had faith in the instant case, the renewal clause there
involved was contained in the lease itself, and there was no special
lo Houston v. Barnett, 90 Ore. 94, 175 P. 619 (1918) ; Kaufman v. Liggett, 209 Pa.
S7. 58 A. 129, 67 L. R. A. 353 (1904). Courts are in general agreement that if the
terms are to be fixed by arbitrators a court of equity, on refusal by one of the
parties to arbitrate or if the arbitrators cannot agree, may determine what would
be a fair and reasonable rental and thereafter enforce the option accordingly:
Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tele. Co., 120 F. (2d) 982
(1941) ; Maas Bros. v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625, 286 N. W. 104 (1939).
11 Edward v. Tobin, 132 Ore. 38, 284 P. 562, 68 A. L. R. 152 (1930).
12 Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25, 100 Am. Dec. 252 (1869).
13 Bechman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68. 248 P. 262 (1926).
'4 Streicber v. Heimburge, 205 Cal. 675, 272 P. 290 (1928).
There is language in
Bird v. Couchois, 214 Mich. 607, 183 N. W. 36 (1921), which would indicate that the
court would be willing to imply a "reasonable" rent, if necessary, but that case did
not deal with an option to renew but rather a determination of the amount of rent
to be paid for the balance of the original term.
15 208 8. C. 433, 38 S. E. (2d) 495, 166 A. L. R. 1228 (1946).
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equities in favor of the lessees beyond the fact that, after taking possession,
they had invested substantial sums in improvements which had been
made on the assumption of a binding option.
In the second case, that of Young v. Nelson, 16 the option was for an
additional five years at such rental "as may then be agreed upon between
the lessor and lessee." The court held that such a clause was specifically
enforcible at a reasonable rental, even though it contained no provision
for determining the amount of the future rent, on the ground that as
the option was for the benefit of the lessee the covenant should be construed
most strongly against the lessor. That court admitted that its holding
was in a definite and distinct minority category but asserted that it was
doing equity by carrying into operation what it claimed to be the intention
of the parties. Courts generally desire to validate contracts wherever
possible, but they should refuse to read terms and conditions into a
contract which the parties themselves have failed to place therein even
though it might seem equitable to do so.
The third case, that of Hall v. Weatherford,17 provides even less
reliable support for it was a suit brought to quiet title to certain premises
which had been leased to the lessee by the husband alone. The original
lease contained an option to renew for a like period at a price to be agreed
upon or, if not, then to be fixed by the lessor at a figure at which he was
willing to lease to other parties. The husband had, in fact, granted a
renewal at an agreeable increased rental but the wife contended that, as
Arizona, the state in question, was a community property jurisdiction, the
original lease was void for lack of her signature as well as for uncertainty.
The court decided for the lessee on the ground of estoppel by conduct but
did adopt the reasoning of the case last above mentioned. By concluding
that the renewal was completely executed, the court did not have to decide
any issue as to uncertainty in the option, so that case provides little
authority for the reasoning adopted in the instant case. It may be said,
therefore, that the Ohio court has chosen to follow a view based on slender
precedent and definitely one in the minority on this issue.
No Illinois court of review has passed on this precise issue to date but
the decided cases definitely indicate that Illinois would be inclined to
follow the majority rule. In Sterenburg v. Beach,'5 for example, it was
In the earlier case of
16 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 30 A. L. R. 568 (1922).
Anderson v. Frye & Bruhn, 69 Wash. 89, 124 P. 499 (1912), the lease contained an
option for a two year renewal at a rental satisfactory to both lessor and lessee
which the court said would be construed to mean a "reasonable" rental, but the
language was dictum for the original lease was held invalid because not properly
acknowledged.
17 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 56 A. L. R. 903 (1927).
18 219 Ill. App. 68 (1920). The earlier Ohio case of Braun v. Pociey. IS Ohio App.
370 (1923), is in accord with that holding.
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held that the words "lease to be extended if both parties agree" were
too vague and indefinite to constitute a valid covenant for renewal.
Likewise, in Streit v. Fay,19 the option did not fix the amount of rent to
be paid under the renewal in terms of dollars but instead provided that
the lessee might have the "privilege of five years longer by paying
The court there conadditional rent on revaluation now fixed at $500."
cerned, finding no provision as to when and how the revaluation was to
be determined, came to the conclusion that the option was also too indefinite and vague to support renewal. These cases point to the fact that
courts ought not write contracts for otherwise competent parties and
certainly cannot force them to agree. A provision which depends upon
voluntary agreement for its effectiveness should be treated as unenforcible
and void if that agreement is not forthcoming.
R. A. LEwiN
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WHETHER OR NOT SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT OF PERSON SITTING IN
AUTOMOBILE IS JUSTIFIED AS AN INCIDENT TO SEARCH OF AUTOMOBILE FOR

CONTRABAND--The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United

States v. DiRel presented a case in which an investigator of the Office
of Price Administration, having been informed by one Reed that he was
about to buy certain counterfeit gasoline ration coupons from one Buttitta,
went with a municipal police detective to where Buttitta's car was parked
and found the informer sitting on the rear seat of the car with two
gasoline coupons in his hand. Upon interrogation by the officers, Reed
declared that he had obtained the coupons from Buttitta, then sitting
behind the wheel of the car. Alongside the driver sat DiRe, defendant
in the instant case. The three occupants of the car were taken into
custody, were subjected to a tentative search for weapons, and were then
taken to a police station. DiRe was there directed to empty his pockets
and, in compliance with such direction, laid out two gasoline and several
fuel-oil ration coupons which he said he had found in the street. Some
two hours later, after questioning, he was "booked" and a thorough search
was then made of his person which disclosed a much larger number of
counterfeit gasoline rationing coupons concealed between his shirt and
underwear. The decisive evidence thus secured, obtained without a
warrant of any kind, was later used to secure DiRe's conviction on a
charge of knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons.2 The
19 230 Ill. 319, 82 N. E. 648 (1907).

See also Pray v. Clark, 113 Mass. 283 (1873).
'332 U. S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 (1948). Vinson, Ch. J., and
Black, J., dissented.
2 50 U. S. C. App.. Supp. V, § 633.
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Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting,
reversed on the ground that both the search and the arrest were illegal. 3
Upon certiorari, the prosecution contended the search was justified either
as a proper incident to a lawful arrest or as an incident to the search of
a vehicle reasonably believed to be carrying contraband. Despite this,
a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the reversal of the conviction, thereby providing an emphatic reassertion
of the vitality of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure which have lately been threatened with attenuation.
Parts of the majority opinion dealing with search as an incident to
a lawful arrest and with aspects of conspiracy and waiver of constitutional
guarantees merely reiterate well-defined legal principles. The holding
on the claim that the search of DiRe's person was justified as an incident
to search of a vehicle reasonably suspected to be carrying contraband,
on the other hand, required consideration of a novel contention and led
to a well-reasoned refutation thereof. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for
4
the court, conceded that, since the decision in Carroll v. United States,
there has been an increasing tendency to believe that automobiles are
more vulnerable to search without warrant than are other forms of
property, but he ascribed the holding therein to the assumption by the
court that it was applying the intent of Congress to facilitate the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, 5 a measure subsequently repealed.
He noted, however, that the decision "falls short of establishing a doctrine
that, without such legislation, automobiles nonetheless are subject to search
without warrant in the enforcement of all federal statutes."6 The most
that could be said of that case is that some of the language therein might
be used to make a distinction between what would be a reasonable search
when applied to an automobile in contrast to what would be proper if
the search was of a residence or of other fixed premises. 7 Any doubt as
I

. 159 F. (2d) 818 (1947). Clark, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
4 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790 (1925).
5 U. S. C. A., Tit. 27, repealed Aug. 27, 1935, 49 Stat. 872.
6 332 U. S. 581 at 585. 68 S. Ct. 222 at 224, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 at 222.
7 Compare Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453
(1946), where the search of a business place for gasoline rationing coupons was
upheld. absent a search warrant, on the ground the coupons were public property,
with Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145. 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947),
wherein an exhaustive search of residential quarters without warrant was treated
as proper despite vigorous criticism from four of the justices. See also Hart v.
United States, 162 F. (2d) 74 (1947). It is interesting to note that Justice Murphy,
who dissented In the Harris case, quoted from the opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals In the DiRe case, 159 F. (2d) 818 at 820. when he repeated the words of
Learned Hand, J., to the effect that if "the prosecution of crime is to be conducted
with so little regard for that protection which centuries of English law have given
to the individual, we are indeed at the dawn of a new era; and much that we have
deemed vital to our liberties, is a delusion." See 331 U. S. 145 at 195, 67 S. Ct. 1098
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to the attitude of the federal courts on the subject should have been
dispelled by the recent case of Hart v. United Statess in which the court
declared: "If we now sustain the search of one's automobile without
inquiry into the validity of the search warrant, under authority of which
the search was made, simply because probable cause existed for such a
search, we will have gone a long way toward abdicating the idea that
judicial sanction is a condition precedent to the authority. If probable
cause is the only safeguard against unreasonable searches we have
dispensed with the precautionary requirements of the warrant and limited
the judicial function to a post mortem examination of probable cause.
We have thus permitted the exceptions to consume the rule, and rendered
impotent those safeguards, which in another day have been called 'the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security.' "9 It would seem,
then, that the heyday of promiscuous searches of automobiles and their
occupants is rapidly coming to an end. 10
That issue was not actually decided for, as the court pointed out, no
actual search of the automobile was made. The court was asked, however,
to extend an assumed right to search the car to include the right to search
the person of an occupant thereof on the theory that common sense
demanded that such a right should exist in cases where the contraband
sought was small in size and could readily be concealed on the person,
an argument which had been given some point by the majority holding
in the case of Harrisv. United States." In pointed fashion, that request
was rejected on the ground that the relationship of the automobile to the
crime of illegally transporting liquor in the Carroll case was an indispensable one whereas, in the instant case, it would take a violent stretch
of the imagination to assume that a passenger would know what pieces of
paper were concealed in the pockets of the driver. 1 2 No federal cases
at 119, 91 L.Ed. 1399 at 1430. An appendix to the dissent in the Davis case tabulates
the legislation on the point while a similar appendix to the Harris case provides a
tabular analysis of all decisions since Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. 34 S.
Ct. 341. 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
8 162 F. (2d) 74 (1-47).
' 162 F. (2d) 74 at 76.
10 See State v. Miles. - Wash. (2d) -,
190 P. (2d) 740 (1948), for example.
where the court relied upon and quoted extensively from the decision in the instant
case for support of the proposition that it was error to admit evidence seized from
bystanders or taken from an automobile belonging to one of them parked near the
scene of a crime for which crime they were not prosecuted but instead were tried
for possessing the articles so seized.
11331 U1.S. 145. 67 S. Ct. 1098. l L. Ed. 1399 (1947), noted in 96 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 128. 33 Va. L. Rev. 640.
12 The opinion in the instant ease stattes: "We are not convinced that a person.
by mere presence in a suspected car. loses immunities from search of his person to
which he would otherwise be entitled." See 332 U. S. 581 at 587, 68 S. Ct. 222 at 225,
92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 at 222.
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were cited to support the holding declaring it improper to extend the
scope of the search to include persons present at the time, but the case of
United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles, 8
wherein a general search and seizure of everything contained in several
warehouses and the indiscriminate arrest of several persons merely
present at the time was held unreasonable, seems to support the view.
There are also state cases in point. In Jokosh v. State,14 for example,
a warrant to search certain premises was held not to authorize a search
of persons found therein and, according to Purkey v. Maby,15 this is
particularly true if the persons searched are not named in the affidavit
6
upon which the search warrant issues.'
Viewed as a dry legal conclusion, the holding in the instant case superficially discloses a narrow refusal to extend a rule of law which was
probably an unwarranted extension of fundamental principles to begin
with. But it is difficult to read the opinion therein, or that in any decision
on the question of search and seizure, without putting the immediate case
against the background of man's halting struggle to attain a system of
government which will be strong enough to protect him and yet against
which his right as an individual to live with a minimum amount of
governmental interference will prevail. Any conflict in the cases, whether
7
caused by variance in the construction given to constitutional guarantees,
by attempts to view the issue from the standpoint of the officer, with his
skill and knowledge, rather than that of the average citizen under similar
circumstances,"8 or by a refusal to define what constitutes an unreasonable
search except as required by the immediate case under examination, leaves
the fundamental problem remain. Every decision on the subject, therefore, assumes an importance that cannot be overemphasized for it can
carry connotations of tremendous significance. The holding in the instant
case may rightfully be considered as a landmark one for it tends to insure
to the individual a maximum of personal freedom which the holding in
Harris v. United States 9 bad subjected to jeopardy.
I. STEIN
is 52 F. (2d) 49 (1931).

14 181 Wis. 160, 193 N. W. 976 (1923).
15 33 Ida. 281, 193 P. 79 (1920).
16 See also Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132, L. R. A. 1915E 399 (1914)
Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567. 65 N. W. 530, 31 L. R. A. 163 (1895) ; People
v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559. 171 N. W. 557, 3 A. L. R. 1505 (1919), which contains
an excellent dissertation on the historical background of the origin of search warrants; and State v. Massle, 95 WV.Va. 233, 120 S. E. 514 (1923).
17 In an official headnote to the decision in McIntyre v. State. 190 Ga. 872. 11 S. E.
(2d) 5 (1940). appears the statement: "Under repeated decisions by this court, the
admission in evidence in a State-court trial of articles taken from the defendant
and his automobile by State officers without a search warrant would not violate
[the sections] of the constitution of this State ... prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures and compulsory self-incrimination."
is See United States v. Sebo, 101 F. (2d) 889 (1939).
1- 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098. 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
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CARRIER-The plaintiffs in the case of Carmack v. Great
American Indemnity Company' were proprietors of a retail grocery
market operating under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act and
had an illegally employed minor working for them. 2 This minor employee
sustained an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his
employment and, in direct consequence thereof, he died. The deceased's
mother, because of her dependency and the circumstances of his employment,3 became entitled to additional compensation 4 which the plaintiffs
paid under a lump-sum settlement by which they specifically reserved
INSURANCE

their right to claim reimbursement from their insurance carrier for the

added compensation so paid. The plaintiffs then sued the insurance
carrier claiming to be entitled to reimbursement under paragraph I(a)
of the standard form of workmen's compensation insurance policy, pursuant to which the insurer expressly agreed with the employer to pay
promptly to any person, entitled thereto under the workmen's compensa-

tion laws, the entire amount of any sum due. The plaintiffs also relied
on Section 26(a) (3) of the Illinois act 5 which provides that the employer's
insurance policy must insure his entire liability to pay compensation
awards and further directs that any provision in the policy attempting
to limit or modify the liability of the insurer shall be wholly void. The
defendant,

on the other hand, contended that if the plaintiff was to

recover at all it had to be on paragraph I(b) of the standard policy
which grants indemnity only against the claims of those who are legally
employed, hence the additional benefits paid by reason of the illegal
employment constituted a penalty for which the employer was alone
liable. In affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the lower
court, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held that as the
provision for additional compensation was distinct from the penal provisions of the Child Labor Law6 the additional assessment was not to be
regarded as a penalty against the employer so was included in the policy
coverage. A certificate of importance was granted for appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court and it affirmed the holding for the plaintiff.
1400 Ill. 93, 78 N. E. (2d)

507 (1948), affirming 332 Ill. App. 354, 75 N. E. (2d)

521 (1947).
2 The employee had been hired in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 31.9,
in that no working certificate, as required thereby, had been obtained.
3111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 144(c).
4 Ibid., § 144(i).

5 Ibid., § 163(a) (3).
e Ibid., § 17 et seq.
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The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act and most other statutes
are silent on the character to be attached to the additional award due an
illegally employed minor, but Section 14-a(2) of the New York statute7
declares that the additional sum is to be regarded as a liability imposed
upon the employer alone8 and Florida, 9 New Jersey, 10 Pennsylvania"
and Utah 1 2 have incorporated similar provisions in their statutes. The
Wisconsin statute, in contrast, while- basically in accord with the New
York view in that the employer is made liable for the increased compensation payable to illegally employed minors, directs that the insurer
is to be held secondarily liable, 13 thereby providing an added security to
the injured employee in case his employer should turn out to be insolvent.
Illustrative of the operation of these statutes is the New York case
of Bogartz v. Astor 1 4 which interprets the language of the section referred
to above. The plaintiff there, a minor, had been illegally employed by
the defendant' 5 and through the defendant's negligence he was injured.
The employer's insurance carrier paid the normal workmen's compensation
award to the minor. Subsequently a further sum equal to the amount of
the award was paid by the employer to the minor pursuant to Section
14-a(2). Thereafter the minor sought and was granted a recovery of his
damages from the defendant in a third-party action relying on the contention that the additional payment under the statute was a penalty
against the employer for employing a minor in violation of the Child
Labor Law. The upper court in reversing held that the extra payment
required by that statute was not a mere pecuniary punishment or penalty
but was to be treated the same as any other monetary benefit secured by
the compensation law. As a consequence the injured employee was held
obliged to make full restoration of the total award received by him in
7 Cahill's

Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 66, § 14-a(2).
8 It also directs that any provision in an insurance policy designed to relieve the
employer from such increased liability shall be void.
9 Fla. Stat. Ann. 1943, § 440.54.
10 N. J. Stat. Ann. 1940, § 34:15-10. See also Damato v. DeLucia, 10 N. J. Misc. 308,
159 A. 526 (1932).
11 Purdon Pa. Stats. Ann., Tit. 77. § 672, interpreted in McGuckin v. Keystone Dye
& Metal Works, 29 Pa. D. & C. 556 (1937). and in Lucia v. Capitol Pants Co., 29
Pa. D. & C. 590 (1937).
12 Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. III, Tit. 42, § 42-1-57.10, applied in Ortega v. Salt
Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P. (2d) 885 (1945).
13 Wis. Stat. 1943, Ch. 102, § 102.62.
14 293 N. Y. 563, 59 N. E. (2d) 246 (1944).
15 The employee there, as in the instant case, had been hired in violation of Cahill's
Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 32, § 131(1), in that no working certificate had been
obtained.
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the event he should be made whole thereafter by recovery from a third
party for the same injury. 16 In the event nothing was recovered, however,
it would seem that the employer would be unable to shift the burden of
the additional sum so paid to any other person but would be forced to
bear the same himself.
The decision in the instant case, although one of first impression in
Illinois, does not stand alone for there are two other decisions which
uphold the views expressed therein. In the Michigan case of Stuart v.
Spencer Coal Company17 and in the California case of Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Company v. Industrial Accident Commission' s it
was held that the insurer was liable for the additional compensation by
reason of the terms of the contract with the employer. In each instance
the obligation to pay the entire amount of the award was said to rest on
the language contained in paragraph I(a) of the standard policy, despite
the employer's illegal conduct in hiring a minor. The absence of designation in the statute that the additional compensation is a penalty to be
borne by the employer alone would seem to be the controlling and
distinguishing feature.
The admitted purpose of workmen's compensation laws is to promote
general welfare by providing compensation for accidental injuries or
death suffered in the course of employment. Similarly, the purpose of
requiring the employer to carry insurance is one to secure the employee
against being forced to bear the loss which would be produced in the event
of the inability of the employer to pay. But it would seem reasonable
that some further provision should be made to discourage employers from
illegally employing minors, in addition to the penal provisions of child
labor laws. Illinois, while assuring the illegally employed minor payment
16 Accord: Inland Steel Company v. Fries, 114 Ind. App. 119. 49 N. E. (2d) 382
(1943) ; Wynkoop v. Superior Coal Co.. 116 Ind. App. 237, 63 N. E. (2d) 305 (1945) :
Damato v. DeLucia, 10 N. J. Misc. 308. 159 A. 526 (1932) : Sackolwitz v. Charles
Hamburg & Co., Inc.. 295 N. Y. 264. 67 N. E. (2d) 152 (1946): Molina v. B. D.
Kaplan & Co.. 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 662 (1943), affirmed in 293 N. Y. 700, 56 N. E. (2d)
586 (1944); Moreno v. Halstead Canning Co., Inc., 258 App. Div. 829, 15 N. Y. S.
(2d) 765 (1939): McGuckin v. Keystone Dye & Metal Works. 29 Pa. D. & C. 556
(1937) : Lucia v. Capitol Pants Co., 29 Pa. D. & C. 5,90 (1937). If the employee elects
to qualify for additional compensation under the statute he may, according to In re
Dearborn Manufacturing Co., 18 F. Supp. 763 (1937), reversed on other grounds in
92 F. (2d) 417 (1937). and Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1,
156 P. (2d) 885 (1945), be precluded from maintaining a civil action for damages.
17 307 Mich. 685. 12 N. W. (2d) 443 (1943). In giving judgment for the employer,
the court stated that the additional compensation, although payable because of the
illegal employment, was not a penalty against the employer but that the insurance
carrier must pay the entire award as it had contracted to do.
18 19 Cal. App. (2d) 583. 65 P. (2d) 1349 (1937). The court found that the policy
expressed in the act itself required the employer to secure payment of all compensation to persons entitled thereto and held the insurance carrier liable for the full
amount, basing its decision squarely upon the carrier's agreement embodied in
paragraph I (a) of the standard policy.
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of his award by making the insurer liable, does nothing to deter the
employer from entering into illegal contracts for hire when it permits him
to shift the loss to others. The New York view tends to discourage illegal
employment by making the employer solely liable but at the potential
expense of the minor employee if the employer should turn out to be
insolvent. The Wisconsin statute, on the other hand, not only discourages
illegal employment by making the employer liable but, by making the
insurer secondarily liable, guarantees the employee complete compensation.
It, therefore, seems to carry out most fairly the underlying objectives
and design of workmen's compensation laws.
H. G. BATES
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TION AcT-The minor employee involved in the recent case of Ferguson

v. Industrial Commission' sustained what appeared to be an insignificant
injury in the course of his employment so no immediate report thereof
was made to the employer. The minor's condition became worse, however,
and required hospitalization some twenty-six days later. Although a
guardian had been appointed for the minor's estate about a year prior
to the injury he had no knowledge of the accident until the thirty-day
period fixed by statute for the giving of notice had expired2 but promptly
on learning of the facts he then notified the employer and began proceedings to recover compensation. The claim was denied by the arbitrator
for failure to give prompt notice and that holding was affirmed by both
the commission and the circuit court. On writ of error obtained by the
guardian, the Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed despite the contention
that the minor claimant, being under a legal disability, was entitled to
the benefit of certain savings provisions, modified in 1927, which exempted
''mental incompetents" from the requirement of compliance with what
would otherwise be a jurisdictional element of the statute.'
The court
pointed out that minors were, for this purpose, to be considered the same
as adult employees, 4 particularly if capable of legal representation through
a duly constituted guardian.
: 397 Ill. 348, 74 N. E. (2d) 539 (1947).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 161, requires that the notice be given within thirty
days after the accident.
3 Laws 1927, p. 513; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 145(h) and 161.
4 The term "employee," according to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48. § 142, includes
minors who are, for the purpose of that statute, to be "considered the same and
have the same power to contract, receive payments and give quittances therefor as
adult employees."
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It has been noted that "probably no question connected with workmen's compensation law is more novel . . . than the question of the
status of minor employees under such law, and . . . that there is no

fixed rule or principle of decision established, but that the question is one
of the construction of statutes which vary materially in different jurisdictions. '"5 The writer of that statement might have noted that the
problem is complicated even more because of changes made from time
to time in the statutes in any given jurisdiction, but there is, nevertheless,
some unity of intent expressed by both courts and legislatures for the
direct protection of minors. 6 Some statutes, for example, expressly direct
that limitation periods contained in workmen's compensation laws are
not to apply to minors until after the appointment of a legal representative.7 Others extend that saving provision to mental incompetents and
to minor dependents without representation. 8 Only a small minority direct
that the minor employee shall stand, for all purposes, in the same relation
to the workmen's compensation laws as do adults.9
Illinois law has now, for the first time, been established by the
instant decision, but it was not always in that condition and, judging by
prior cases, was not such as would lead to the expectation that the
holding therein would normally be produced. In Walgreen"Company v.
Industrial Commission,"° for example, no claim was made on behalf of
the minor employee until four years after the injury. The statute then
provided that if the injured employee should be "incompetent" at the
time of the injury any time limitations imposed should not run "so long
as said incompetent employee is without a conservator or guardian."11
5 See opinion of Commissioner Hickman. in Latcholia v. Texas Employer's Insurance Association, 140 Tex. 231 at 235, 167 S. W. (2d) 164 at 166 (1942).
6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text (Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis,
Mo., 1945), Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, p. 197.
7 Ark. Laws 1939. p. 777, § 18(c) ; Cal. Deering Code, Labor, Part 4. Ch. 2. § 5408;
Ida. Code Anno. 1932, Ch. 12. § 43-1206; Ind. Burns Stat. Ann. 1933. § 40-1413; Kan.
Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 44, § 509; Ky. Rev. Stats. 1946, § 342.210; Me. Rev. Stats. 1944,
Vol. 1, Ch. 26, § 23; Mo. Rev. Stats. Anno. 1939, Vol. 11, Ch. 29, § 3727; Mont. Rev.
Code 1935, Ch. 256, § 2900: N. J. Rev. Stats. 1937, Vol. 2. Ch. 34:15, § 51; N. Y.
Baldwin Cons. Laws 1938. Vol. 7. Work. Comp. Law, Art. 7, § 115; N. Car. Gen. Stats.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 97, § 50; S. Car. Code 1942. § 7035-52; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats.
Anno.. Art. 8306. § 13; Va. Code Anno. 1942. Ch. 76A, § 1887(50); Wyo. Comp. Stats.
Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, § 72-107.
8 Okla. Stats. 1941, Tit. 85. § 106: Vt. Pub. Laws 1933. Tit. 30, § 6540.
9 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 296; Ariz. Code Anno. 1939: Ch. 56, § 56-974: Colo.
Stats. Anno. 1937, Ch. 97, § 288(b) ; Minn. Anno. Stats. 1941, Vol. 13, § 176-18.
lo 323 Ill. 194, 153 N. E. 831, 48 A. L. R. 1199 (1926).
11 Laws 1919, p. 544. then provided: "In case an injured employee shall be
incompetent at the time when any right or privilege accrues to him under the provisions of this Act, a conservator or guardian may be appointed, pursuant to law,
and may, on behalf of such incompetent, claim and exercise any such right or privilege with the same force and effect as if the employee himself had been competent
and had claimed or exercised said right or privilege; and no limitations of time by
this Act provided shall run so long as said incompetent employee is without a
conservator or guardian."
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On the strength thereof, an award of compensation was affirmed, the
court reaching the conclusion that the "incompetent" person referred
to necessarily included a minor for another provision dealt with those
who suffered from mental incapacity. 12 In still another case, that of
Waechter v. Industrial CoMmission,'8 the court permitted a minor dependent to recover death benefits over three years after the death of his parent,
the employee, by pointing out that the provisions of the workmen's
compensation statute, which purported to treat minors as possessing the
same power to contract, receive payments and give quittance thereof as
would adults,1 4 were to be confined to minor employees and were not
applicable to minor dependents. Even more striking was the holding in
Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation15 wherein the minor employee
was allowed to conduct a common-law action against the employer even
though he had not filed a rejection of benefits within the six-month period
fixed by law,' 6 especially since the minor himself had no legal power to7
make a binding declaration and had no legal guardian at the time.1
The conclusion would, therefore, seem to be that, up to the present, there
has been a pronounced legislative and judicial policy in this state to
protect the rights of minors.
Support for the decision in the instant case, however, was said to
rest in the fact that, subsequent to the decision in the Walgreen case, the
legislature amended the statute, in essence, by prefixing the word "mental"
before the word "incapacity" in the section which had been construed
in that case' 8 and by adding certain other provisions with respect to
mental incapacity.' 9 These amendments, at first blush, would logically
make it appear that the several periods of limitation should run against
an injured minor employee, unless he was also a mental incompetent, for
while minors are "incompetent" in a strict legal sense they are not
usually classified as being "mental incompetents," for that term is usually
applied to idiots, lunatics or insane persons. Such at least has been the
12 That section is presently found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 48, § 145(h).
13367 Ill. 256, 11 N. E. (2d) 378 (1937), followed and approved in Skaggs v.

Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 535, 21 N. E. (2d) 731 (1939).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 142.

15324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 (1944), noted in 23 CH0cGo-KFINT LAw
Rmvgw 355. See also Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N. E.

(2d) 754 (1939), affirmed in 372 Ill. 311, 23 N. E. (2d) 703 (1939).
16 I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 143.
17 Much the same view has been reached with respect to suits on behalf of minors
against municipal corporations: McDonald v. Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E.
476, 2 A. L. R. 1359 (1918). Accord: Murphy v. Village of Ft. Edward, 213 N. Y.
397, 107 N. E. 716 (1915).
18 Laws 1927, p. 517.
19 Ibid., p. 501.
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holding in a number of other states possessing substantially similar laws,2"
but there are decisions to the contrary 2' and one case even goes so far
as to excuse non-compliance with the statute where the minor had a
22
general guardian at the time of the injury.
It would seem, then, that much will depend upon the attitude brought
to bear on the problem. As the Illinois court seems bent to give strict
adherence to the express word of the statute, notwithstanding that it
marks a deviation from what had previously been an established policy
in favor of minors, the instant decision is worthy of more than passing

notice.
R. A.

LEWIN

20 Royal Indemnity Company v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S. E. (2d) 57 (1941) ;
Porter v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 86, 166 S. E. 675 (1932) ; Williams v.
Cities Service Gas Co., 151 Kan. 497, 99 P. (2d) 822 (1940) ; Brenn v. City of St.
John, 149 Kan. 416, 87 P. (2d) 546 (1939) ; Suttle v. Marble Produce Co., 140 Kan.
13, 34 P. (2d) 116 (1934) ; Mallory v. Ward Baking Co., 270 Mich. 91, 258 N. W. 414
(1935) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Tatti, 258 Mich. 357, 242 N. W. 777 (1932) ; Gelewski
v. Cudile, 17 N. J. Misc. 49, 4 A. (2d) 9 (1939) ; Westrick v. Industrial Commission,
50 Ohio App. 234, 197 N. E. 823 (1935) ; Indian Territory Ilium. Oil Co. v. Crown,
158 Okla. 51, 12 P. (2d) 689 (1932) ; Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 157 Okla. 278, 12 P.
(2d) 177 (1932) ; Edge v. Dunean Mills, 202 S. C. 189, 24 S. E. (2d) 268 (1943);
Franse v. Knox Porcelain Corp., 171 Tenn. 49, 100 S. W. (2d) 647 (1937).
21 Walsh v. Flour City Ornamental Iron Co., 157 Minn. 396, 196 N. W. 486
(1923) ; Lineberry v. Town of Mebane, 219 N. C. 257, 13 S. E. (2d) 429, 142 A. L. R.
1033 (1941) ; Latcholia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 140 Tex. 231, 167 S. W. (2d)
164 (1942).
22 In Dulin v. Industrial Accident Commission, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 89, 149 P. (2d)
868 (1944), the court held that the provision tolling the limitation period "until a
trustee or guardian is appointed" was to be read with the provision authorizing the
industrial commission to appoint some one to represent the minor employee and did
not contemplate representation by a general guardian.

